

VZCZCXRO6426  
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK  
DE RUEHGB #3397/01 2840629  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 110629Z OCT 07  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE  
RUEHC/OPEC COLLECTIVE  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3817

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 003397

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2017

TAGS: [ECON](#) [EPET](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: RECLASSIFIED COPY (C REL UK): OIL MINISTER COURTS  
ENAMORED OIL FIRMS WHILE KRG CONTRACTS COMPLICATE FRAMEWORK  
LAW NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 3071

[B. B. BAGHDAD 3038](#)

Classified By: Economic Counselor Todd P. Schwartz for reasons 1.4 (b)  
and (d).

[1](#). (U) This reclassified cable replaces Baghdad 3117. The  
cable is otherwise unchanged.

[2](#). (C REL UK) SUMMARY: Iraq Oil Minister Hussain  
al-Shahristani assured a Dubai conference hall of  
international oil company (IOC) executives that the  
Government of Iraq (GOI) would welcome IOC investment in  
Iraq's petroleum sector, notwithstanding ongoing negotiations  
to approve a Hydrocarbon Framework Law (HFL) and the  
country's challenging security environment. Shahristani said  
that IOC technology, expertise, training, and capital will be  
crucial to the GOI's strategy for developing its oil  
industry. Though heretofore reluctant to sign agreements,  
IOCs both large and small made clear to Econoffs that they  
are anxious to invest in Iraq, preferably, but not  
necessarily, under an approved HFL and improved security  
circumstances.

[3](#). (C REL UK) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The conference buzzed with  
news that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed a  
production sharing contract (PSC) with Hunt Oil Company--a  
leading, mid-size, privately held U.S. firm--pursuant to the  
KRG's recently approved regional oil and gas law (reftel A).  
Shahristani hastened to declare such agreements "illegal,"  
prompting the KRG to rebuke him public and call for his  
resignation. The KRG-Hunt deal thus further complicated an  
already difficult negotiating environment for the HFL. More  
such deals would likely make negotiations even tougher, and  
other IOCs advised Econoffs that they are in fact negotiating  
with the Kurds. IOC eagerness to invest in Iraq is  
encouraging, reflecting confidence that they will be able to  
operate in the country in the coming months and years. But  
KRG and IOC unwillingness to wait for an approved framework  
law before signing contracts threatens the law's passage and  
the political reconciliation its approval could facilitate  
(reftel B). END SUMMARY

-----  
OIL MINISTER OUTLINES A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE SECTOR  
-----

[4](#). (U) Shahristani occupied center stage at the September  
8-10 "Iraq Petroleum 2007" conference in Dubai. Originally  
conceived as a showcase for an approved HFL, the GOI's  
inability to pass the law necessitated a modified agenda.  
Instead, representatives from all the major IOCs and a  
menagerie of minor ones comprised the majority of the roughly  
300 attendees anxiously awaiting the latest on the GOI's  
plans for the petroleum sector and the ongoing HFL  
negotiations. Shahristani outlined the GOI's short- and

medium-term plans for developing the oil industry, assured the IOCs that they would play an important part in those plans, and predicted (optimistically) that the Council of Representatives (CoR) would approve the HFL "in the coming weeks."

¶15. (U) Shahrستاني stated that the GOI's short-term goal is to increase oil production from "just under 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) to 3 million bpd by 2008 and 3.5 million by the end of 2009." Medium term, by 2018, he said the GOI plans to increase production to 6 million bpd. Shahrستاني also spoke of medium-term plans to explore unexamined blocs to increase Iraq's proven reserves from 115 billion barrels to 160 billion. Regarding natural gas, Shahrستاني said the short-term goal would be to utilize more and flare less of it, while the medium-term aim would be to increase proven reserves from 3.1 trillion cubic meters, or 109.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf), to 4.6 trillion cubic meters, or 162.5 tcf. (NOTE: "Flaring" entails burning associated natural gas incidentally recovered during oil production; the practice is wasteful, inefficient, and harmful to the environment. Capturing and utilizing associated gas, e.g., for power generation, is the recognized industry best practice. END NOTE)

¶16. (C REL UK) The GOI's strategy for achieving its short-term goals is to manage better, and improve the facilities of, oil fields already under production. Shahrستاني suggested that developing some 50 discovered but dormant fields would help Iraq achieve its medium-term production targets. Shahrستاني did not expressly mention plans to improve or expand Iraq's storage and pipeline infrastructure to accommodate short-term production increases. He did, however, discuss medium-term plans for building new storage capacity, another export

BAGHDAD 00003397 002 OF 005

terminal in the south, and pipelines to link these elements, including an "eastern pipeline." (NOTE: At least one media outlet has seized upon this phrase to report that Iraq intends to build a pipeline to Iran. A senior GOI official separately clarified to Econoffs that the "eastern pipeline" would not/not go to Iran. Instead, the pipeline would run south by southeast well within the Iraqi side of Iraq-Iran border, approximately from Diyala province to Basrah. END NOTE)

¶17. (SBU) Indicative of relations between the GOI and the KRG, no KRG representative--such as Dr. Ashti Hawrami, KRG Minister of Natural Resources--attended the conference. Moreover, Shahrستاني mentioned no Ministry of Oil (MoO) plans for the north. Further evincing a lack of coordination, in response to a question regarding whether KRG investments were included in a MoO report on refineries, Shahrستاني replied in the negative and said that the MoO simply distributes funds to the KRG for it to spend as it sees fit.

-----  
THE GOI'S ENVISAGED ROLE FOR IOCS IN IRAQ  
-----

¶18. (SBU) Shahrستاني made clear that the GOI welcomes IOC investment in Iraq and that IOC technology, expertise, training, and capital would be crucial to the GOI's strategy for developing its decrepit oil industry. With the sector's physical and human capital badly degraded by years of war, sanctions, mismanagement, and terrorist attacks, Shahrستاني emphasized that the GOI would embrace those IOCs interested not just in finding and producing crude, but also in improving Iraq's infrastructure and human resources for the long term, through investment, technology transfer, and intensive training of Iraqi personnel. Shahrستاني stressed that the overarching principles governing IOC participation in Iraq's petroleum sector would be that it (a) maximize economic benefit for the Iraqi people and (b) preserve Iraqi sovereignty over its hydrocarbon natural resources. In

short, he said, IOC participation will complement, not displace, the GOI's own efforts to develop its oil industry.

¶9. (SBU) Though key elements of the HFL remain to be negotiated, and model contracts to serve as a starting point with IOCs are in their draft stages, Shahrستاني sketched how the GOI foresees IOCs participating in Iraq's petroleum sector. Supported by Natic al-Bayati, former MoO Director General (DG) of Reservoir and Oil Fields Development and now DG of Contracting and Licensing, Shahrستاني outlined the types of agreements the GOI would favor and the contracting process contemplated by the current draft framework law. The two men expressed a decided preference for service contracts instead of PSCs. (NOTE: IOCs generally prefer PSCs because they enable the firms to take title to a share of the reserves covered in the agreement and book them as assets; booking reserves strengthens the firms' balance sheets and, among other things, allows them to borrow funds more cheaply. Some governments prefer service contracts, in which the government simply pays the IOC a fee for services, because they--or their constituents--associate PSCs with "giving up sovereignty" over the country's natural resources. END NOTE)

¶10. (U) Shahrستاني said the near-term focus for IOC participation would be to increase production from fields already operating through service contracts signed with the competent authority for the field in question: the MoO, a regional authority (i.e., the KRG), or the yet to be created Iraq National Oil Company (INOC). (NOTE: The draft framework law would not create INOC; separate legislation not yet presented to the CoR would be needed to do so. END NOTE) Shahrستاني implied that with comparatively modest IOC investment--e.g., introducing new reservoir management techniques, technologies, best practices, and infrastructure improvements--Iraq could meet its short-term production goals. For medium- and long-term targets the emphases would be (a) developing, and producing from, discovered but dormant fields and (b) exploring new blocs. In this longer-term context, which entails greater risk for the IOCs, Bayati conceded that the GOI might consider a form of PSC.

¶11. (SBU) Despite their clear preference for service contracts, Shahrستاني and Bayati were at pains to assure IOCs that the GOI would address the firms' interests, noting that the draft HFL states that contracts should provide an "appropriate return on investment to the investor." (NOTE: In addition to the ability to book reserves, IOCs prefer legal regimes and contracts that (a) align the interests of the firm and the government under variable international oil

BAGHDAD 00003397 003 OF 005

price scenarios, (b) accord the firms a reasonable degree of managerial control over operations, and (c) establish a clear tax and regulatory environment. END NOTE) Bayati stated that the GOI foresaw IOCs forming joint-ventures with INOC, or a subsidiary thereof, in which the Iraqi participant took no more than a 50 percent interest. The joint-venture agreement would provide a framework for the relationship, and the IOC would receive remuneration, pursuant to an underlying "improved service contract," in cash or kind (i.e., oil) depending upon the firm's investment. (NOTE: Repeated conversations with IOC executives established that, while they preferred straight PSCs, joint-ventures combined with service agreements and the right terms could also satisfy their concerns. END NOTE)

¶12. (SBU) Bayati explained that under the draft HFL, a new body, the Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC) would set broad petroleum policies, establish priorities for blocs and fields in licensing rounds, draft model contracts, promulgate contract negotiation guidelines, and (perhaps most controversially) approve or reject contracts signed by the MoO, INOC, and the regional authorities. The FOGC would be comprised of the Prime Minister, the Oil, Finance, and Planning Ministers, the Central Bank Governor,

representatives of the regions and oil-producing governorates, the DGs of INOC and its subsidiaries, and three outside experts.

¶13. (U) Notwithstanding all the discussion of the draft framework law, Shahrastani stated several times that there is "no legal vacuum" in Iraq with respect to oil: IOCs interested in signing agreements before the HFL is approved may do so under Saddam-era legislation and, if necessary, such a contract would be brought into line with the HFL once passed. (NOTE: The existing law requires parliamentary approval of all contracts, an unattractive feature to most potential investors. END NOTE) Similarly, in response to a question from an attendee, Shahrastani also said that passing the HFL need not await Iraq's constitutional review process because the law could be brought into line with any pertinent amendments to the constitution that may come to pass.

-----  
OIL MINISTER COURTING ALREADY ENAMORED IOCS  
-----

¶14. (C REL UK) Repeated conversations with representatives from all the major IOCs and an array of smaller firms made clear that, despite the legal uncertainties and ongoing security challenges, they are eager to sign deals in Iraq. In the words of one, "Iraq is in play." Given (a) the enormity of its proven reserves (the world's third largest, at 115 billion barrels), (b) the recognized potential for that figure to grow substantially with more exploration, and (c) its paltry present level of production (the world's lowest production to reserves ratio), Iraq is the darling of the international oil industry. According to one major IOC executive, "we simply must be there." Queried by Econoffs whether an approved HFL would be a necessary condition precedent to signing agreements or actually beginning work in Iraq, a common IOC response was: "We would prefer one, of course, but no. Not necessary. We could work out any issues that came up when the law gets passed." What about improved security conditions? "We would prefer it, but we can always buy security." (COMMENT: Behind this cavalier sounding perspective lies extensive IOC experience operating in legally murky, dangerous environments, e.g., Nigeria, Angola, and Indonesia, and the long-term, capital-intensive nature of their investments: years to start up, billions to put in place, and decades to amortize. END COMMENT)

¶15. (C REL UK) Large and small firms do, however, have differently nuanced assessments of the appropriate timing and strategy for their entry into Iraq. While the major IOCs--e.g., Exxon Mobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, and ConocoPhillips--expressed interest in signing deals for Iraq projects in the coming months, none were enthusiastic about putting their staff in the country immediately. Their eagerness to do deals, however, stemmed from a desire to begin the months-long process of drafting work programs, engineering plans, and the like, which their staffs can do outside Iraq. Given the technical sophistication and capital intensiveness of their investments, and their comparatively high profile, major IOCs generally presented themselves to Econoffs as marginally more risk averse than their smaller competitors.

¶16. (C REL UK) Smaller IOCs, on the other hand, see their window of opportunity closing quickly. More nimble and less capital intensive, several small IOCs told Econoffs that

BAGHDAD 00003397 004 OF 005

their play for the Iraqi market is to be more risk tolerant and sign smaller deals now, for example, to boost production from a smaller already operating field, or to develop a smaller discovered but dormant one. By entering the market now with comparatively minor capital investment, they could sell their operation at a premium to a major firm in the coming years or, depending on the circumstances, remain in Iraq as an independent operator. (COMMENT: In light of

Shahristani's priorities, the GOI might be less interested in investment from smaller companies because they would be less equipped to offer state-of-the-art technologies and long-term training programs for Iraqi personnel. But, if such firms are willing to put personnel in Iraq now, the GOI might welcome their assistance in meeting its short-term production goals. END COMMENT)

-----  
KRG DEALS WITH IOCS FURTHER COMPLICATE HFL NEGOTIATIONS  
-----

¶17. (C REL UK) The conference buzzed with news that the KRG signed a PSC with Hunt Oil Company--a leading, mid-size, privately held U.S. firm--and Impulse Energy Corporation, pursuant to the KRG's recently approved regional oil and gas law (reftel). (NOTE: Roy Hunt, Hunt's Chief Executive and President, has ties to the White House, a point upon which some media outlets have seized. END NOTE) The PSC covers exploration activities in the Dahuk area of the Kurdistan Region. According to a KRG press release, Hunt Oil Company of the Kurdistan Region, a wholly owned Hunt affiliate, will serve as operator under the agreement and begin geological surveys and seismic work before the end of the year. The KRG had previously signed agreements with smaller firms--e.g., DNO of Norway, Genel Enerji of Turkey, and Western Oil Sands of Canada--but this was the first under its new oil and gas law and the first with a U.S. company.

¶18. (C REL UK) Shahristani hastened to declare that all such agreements have "no standing" as far as the GOI is concerned and later said such contracts were "illegal" until reviewed and approved by the "federal authority." (NOTE: Shahristani's reference to the "federal authority" appears to refer to the FOGC foreseen in the draft HFL. Among the more contentious issues in the HFL negotiations is the FOGC's role in overseeing regional petroleum activities. END NOTE) The KRG quickly and publicly issued a sharp rebuke of Shahristani's comments and called for his resignation from the government, challenging his authority to question the legitimacy of contracts awarded by the KRG.

¶19. (C REL UK) The announcement of the KRG-Hunt deal led executives from Shell Oil Company to approach Econoffs and report that Shell too was in negotiations with the KRG. The executives stated that they are considering signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the KRG for an exploration bloc in the Kurdistan Region; the parties would convert the MOU to a PSC upon CoR approval of the HFL. The executives asked whether the USG would view a deal favorably or not. Econoffs advised them that the USG position has been that signing deals before the CoR approves the HFL further complicates negotiations and undermines efforts to pass the law. The Shell reps said that they would advise Econoffs of any developments. (NOTE: Statoil of Norway likewise sought the USG position about a similar deal with the KRG months ago, and USG officials gave the firm the same response. Media have reported rumors of a KRG-Statoil agreement. END NOTE)

-----  
COMMENT  
-----

¶20. (C REL UK) The HFL continues to be the subject of intense negotiations, and the security conditions make investing in Iraq costlier than it otherwise would be. The GOI and the IOCs are nonetheless eager to sign agreements to lay the foundations for developing Iraq's petroleum sector: the undisputed key to Iraq's economic recovery and an important factor in its process of political reconciliation. The most recent known iteration of the HFL, if approved, would be a significant step toward creating a modern regulatory environment under which both the GOI and IOCs could sign contracts that address their respective interests. The CoR's approval of the HFL thus remains a key USG policy objective because of its centrality to political reconciliation in Iraq.

¶21. (C REL UK) KRG deals with IOCs make negotiations on the HFL more difficult. By signing PSCs in particular, the KRG puts pressure on the GOI to take a more accommodating posture in its own negotiations with IOCs; the firms might be less

BAGHDAD 00003397 005 OF 005

willing to accept straight service contracts, the GOI's stated preference, given the precedent set by the Kurds. In addition, creating facts on the ground before the party leaders in Baghdad have worked through the thorniest issues the HFL brings to the fore--fundamentally, the power relationships between the GOI and the regions--heats up the negotiating environment and makes reasoned compromise harder to reach. Moreover, the Hunt deal in particular badly undercuts the USG's position of encouraging IOCs to be patient and exercise restraint while the HFL negotiations proceed. The KRG-Hunt deal was big, but a Shell or Statoil deal would be even bigger. More KRG-IOC deals will likely further delay, and perhaps derail, progress toward a key USG policy objective.  
CROCKER